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1Bridging the Gap between Resilient
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Eberle A. Rambo, Student Member, IEEE, Christoph Seitz, Selma Saidi, Member, IEEE,
and Rolf Ernst, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Conventional fault-tolerance approaches for Networks-on-Chip (NoCs) cannot be applied to high dependability systems due
to their different goals and constraints. These systems impose strict integrity, resilience and real-time requirements. In order to meet
these requirements, all possible effects of random hardware errors must be taken into account, silent data corruption must be
prevented and the resulting system must be predictable in the presence of errors. In this paper, we present a wormhole-switched NoC
with virtual channels for high dependability systems hardened against soft errors. The NoC is developed based on results of a Failure
Mode and Effects Analysis. It efficiently handles errors in different network layers and operates with formal guarantees. Our
experimental evaluation, including an industrial avionics use case, shows that the network is able to achieve predictable behavior even
in aggressive environments with very high error rates while presenting competitive overheads.
Index Terms—Network-on-Chip, Real-time, High Dependability, Reliability, Soft Errors.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MULTIPROCESSOR SYSTEMS-ON-CHIP (MPSOCS) arecurrently being explored for high dependability sys-
tems [1]. When compared to single-cores, MPSoCs are more
efficient and provide the performance required to imple-
ment increasingly complex functionalities demanded by the
market. Examples in different industries are the Flight Man-
agement System (FMS), Advanced Driver Assistance Sys-
tem and Data Centers. Since a failure has serious safety and
commercial consequences, such systems must meet strict
requirements specified by contract and safety standards [2],
[3], [4]. Despite their different target applications, these
systems share an essential common feature: error detection.
Error detection is the base to any fault containment or
tolerance technique. Only after the error is detected (or
foreseen) can the system trigger a corrective (or proactive)
measure. Therefore, error detection must be able to detect
all relevant errors, must do so as soon as possible and
with acceptable overhead. Otherwise, in case of silent data
corruption, error containment and recovery strategies are
rendered useless. When the corruption is finally detected,
the error has already propagated and, even if the total
error impact can be assessed, the recovery is beyond the
capabilities of system, thereby resulting in a failure.
This work focuses on a main component of MPSoCs, the
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Network-on-Chip (NoC) [5]. NoCs are the scalable intercon-
nect solution in MPSoCs, where memory and I/O opera-
tions are packets transmitted over a small-scale network.
As the central interconnect, the NoC must be appropriately
designed to detect and handle noise and errors that may
occur in its infrastructure in order to provide dependable
service [6], [7], [8]. Let us now point out the first requirement
of a NoC for high dependability [8]:
• Integrity: no undetected error (silent data corruption)
should be present in the system. Therefore, if the NoC
delivers a packet, the packet and its delivery must
be correct, i.e. errors in the NoC are detected and
contained to the NoC.
Integrity at the component level is the minimum require-
ment to implement fail-silent or fail-operational failure
strategies at the system level. Yet, it does not address the
component or system reliabilities. That is, the system fails
controllably but it may fail too often. In a high dependable
system, a second requirement is identified:
• Resilience: the NoC must have the capability to recover
from errors and to return to an operational state, toler-
ating possible data loss.
Random hardware errors can be of transient nature,
called soft errors, or permanent nature, called hard errors
[6], [9]. In this paper, we focus on soft errors. Soft errors
can be abstracted as bit-flips in memory or in registers.
Their sources are cosmic radiation, alpha particle strikes and
process variability [9]. In addition, we consider crosstalk
noise as a soft error [10]. Soft errors have different impacts
depending on where and when they occur. In [6], [11], the
authors show that, besides the standard effects usually con-
sidered in the literature, such as packet loss and derouting,
and despite being caused by transient faults, soft errors can
have static effects that lead to continuous corruption and
blocking scenarios during runtime. Moreover, errors can
propagate and indirectly affect the background traffic as
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Fig. 1. OSI network model. Errors affecting the control of the network are
handled in the lower layers. Errors affecting data/payload are addressed
in the upper layers [14].
well. Such error effects cause the violation of integrity and
resilience requirements and thus the failure of the system.
Besides integrity and resilience, certain applications re-
quire guarantees that the system will respond in time. In
real-time systems, a subclass of high dependability systems,
the system must respond in time even under errors, up to
a maximum error rate. That means that the system must
detect errors and recover within a determined interval of
time. These are real-time/predictability requirements:
• Real-time requirements: the system must respond in
time as well as recover in time to meet the target appli-
cation’s timing constraints. In the underlying hardware
design, this requirement translates into predictability,
where worst-case (minimum performance) guarantees
must remain valid also in the presence of errors.
In this paper, we propose a NoC that satisfies strict
integrity, resilience and real-time requirements. In contrast
to the state of the art, we consider all possible impacts and
durations of error effects [6]. We separate and handle the
challenges in different network layers [12], as illustrated in
Figure 1. Errors affecting the NoC’s control logic and data
are handled in the lower layers. This results in a highly
available but lossy service to the upper layers, as error ef-
fects are restricted to packet corruption, loss or small delay.
Guaranteed integrity and packet delivery of the transmitted
data are selectively provided in the upper layers by means
of Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ)-based protocols.
ARQ-based protocols operating in the transport layer
have been recently formally analyzed for real-time networks
[7], [13]. As shown by the authors, ARQ can be used without
jeopardizing the predictability of the system. However, it
does require the underlying network to limit the effects of
errors and rule out static effects [7]. To achieve that, we
exploit well-known fault containment and retransmission
techniques together with the proposed resilient router de-
sign and resilient virtual channel (VC) flow-control. The
VC flow-control manages the access to VCs in wormhole-
switched NoCs. It is a major contributor to cases of static
effect due to a dependency on the state of neighboring
routers that only becomes evident in case of errors [6]. To
overcome those issues, we propose a resilient VC flow-
control. As a results, the proposed NoC operates under soft
errors with formal guarantees [7].
The contribution of this paper is a wormhole-switched
NoC for high dependability real-time systems. This is en-
abled by four key aspects in our design: (1) corrupt packet
dropping policy enforced by a strong fault containment;
(2) resilient router design; (3) resilient virtual-channel flow
control for statically assigned VCs; and (4) reliable trans-
mission. Our experimental results show that, even under
very high error rates, the resilient NoC presents predictable
behavior and is able to achieve it with acceptable hardware
time
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Fig. 2. Performance of a traffic stream in a resilient and a non-resilient
NoC over time.
overhead. Although it focuses on the requirements of high
dependability real-time systems [8], the approach can also
be applied to general systems. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first NoC suitable for high dependability systems
and able to provide formal guarantees under errors.
2 RELATED WORK
Fault tolerance in Networks-on-Chip has been constantly
researched throughout the years [15]. It has been explored
at the link layer [16], [17] as well as the network layer
[18], [19], [20], [21], [22]. Focusing on the requirements of
general purpose and high performance computing systems,
the approaches usually consider that soft errors cause packet
corruption, loss or derouting, and that these effects are
transient.
However, according to results of the Failure Mode and
Effect Analysis (FMEA) introduced in [11] to meet cer-
tification requirements, later extended in [6], besides the
standard effects usually considered in the literature, such as
packet loss and derouting, soft errors can have static effects
leading to continuous corruption and blocking scenarios
during runtime. Moreover, errors can propagate and indi-
rectly affect the background traffic [6], [11], [23]. Such error
effects cause the violation of integrity, resilience and (real-
time) predictability requirements and thereby the failure of
the system.
In safety critical real-time systems, such errors have a
fatal impact on the latency and, by extension, the pre-
dictability, leading to the failure of the entire system. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates the latency of a traffic stream observed
over time on two different NoCs (retransmission is not
included): a resilient predictable NoC; and a baseline NoC
which is non-resilient and only predictable in the absence of
errors. Both NoCs operate correctly (latency is within its
lmax and lmin bounds) until soft errors occur at t1 and
t2. In the resilient design, the effect is transient and its
impact is bounded (lerr). In the baseline, soft errors cause
static effects that result in very high latencies (L). After
t1, which could be caused by the derouting of a packet
from another traffic stream, the non-resilient design is able
to recover. After t2, however, it remains blocked: affected
packets accumulate in the routers’ buffers and backpressure
propagates throughout the network, leading to permanent
blocking of the NoC. The NoC design must rule out static
effects without triggering a network reset or handling them
as hard errors and ensure controlled impacts (lerr).
The objective of existing approaches is to increase the
overall reliability of the network. Most of the work [20],
[21], [22] target packet-switched networks, providing relia-
bility and guaranteed delivery of packets in the lower net-
work layers based on hop-by-hop retransmission (between
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Fig. 3. The router architecture.
adjacent routers) [12]. Recovering from packet corruption
and loss consists of retransmitting a correct copy from the
previous router. The task of handling packet derouting is
usually delegated to the dynamic routing, which delivers
the packet through a different route after the packet has
derouted. Variants with end-to-end retransmission and/or
forward error correction and hybrids between both are also
possible. In forward error correction [12], Error-Correcting
Codes (ECCs) are employed to correct the data at the desti-
nation instead of retransmitting. Faster wormhole-switched
networks have also been similarly addressed [18], [19].
The current state of the art in fault-tolerance for NoCs is
well suited to increase the overall reliability of the network
but do not satisfy the requirements of high assurance real-
time systems. This is because the techniques either:
• Rely on dynamic routing [20], [21], [22]: the local rout-
ing decision violates the real-time requirements, as the
predictability of the NoC is severely impaired. This is
further aggravated by traffic deflection, which allows
unexpected traffic overhead in the network. Predictabil-
ity requires static routing [1], [24];
• Address packet-switched NoCs or wormhole-switched
ones with dynamic VC allocation [18], [19]: traffic from
different classes in real-time systems requires sufficient
independence, i.e. isolation between each traffic classes,
since they potentially have different treatment (e.g.
priorities). This requires static VC allocation [1], [6];
• Use an insufficient error model [16], [17]: it has been
shown that transient faults can lead to static effects
[6], leading to unexpected blocking scenarios during
runtime. All possible impacts and durations of error
effects must be taken into account.
In order to tackle this problem, the NoC should be
designed for high dependability systems [1], [8]. In the
absence of errors, the NoC is predictable and satisfies real-
time requirements. The NoC is then subjected to the FMEA-
based analysis of [6]. The analysis uncovers all impacts of
soft errors and classifies them with respect to duration and
propagation, resulting in a comprehensive error model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the
sequel, we present the baseline NoC and the error model,
upon which this work is developed. Section 4 presents
the hardening of the baseline NoC against soft errors. An
evaluation of the resulting NoC is presented in Section 5.
Finally, Section 6 draws the conclusions.
VC Flit Type Route Tile Port CRC PayloadHF/SF
Size 3 bits 2 30 3 3 99
VC Flit Type CRC LOP PayloadBF/TF
Size 3 bits 2 2 3 130
Fig. 4. Single (SF), Head (HF), Body (BF) and Tail (TF) flit formats.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 The Baseline Architecture
The starting point of this work is a typical NoC for real-
time mixed-critical systems [1]. The network implements XY
deterministic source routing, where the route and virtual
channel (VC) are defined at the source; wormhole switching,
where variable-sized packets are composed of fixed-sized
Flow Control Units (flits); and virtual-channel flow control,
where flits transit through a number of VCs. We assume the
SLIP arbitration [25], a two-stage round-robin scheduler.
The router architecture is shown in Figure 3. The routers
are input-buffered and the Input Buffer (IB) contains a FIFO
queue for each VC. The Switch Arbiter (SA) implements
the SLIP arbitration. The Virtual Channel Access Controller
(VCAC) manages the access to VCs in downstream routers.
The crossbar switch connects the input buffers to the respec-
tive output ports according to the arbitration grants. The
flits are then forwarded from the input buffer directly to the
downstream router. The router implements stop-and-wait
flow control, raising a stop signal to inform the near-full
state of the VC queues to the upstream router.
Route management is performed before the flit is stored
in buffers to keep the routing data for the next router always
in the first position. The route is encoded as a list of runs,
which is a pair: output port (direction) and number of hops
(distance). During a run, the hop counter is decremented.
Once the packet finishes a run, the route is rotated: the
finished run is moved to the end of the list and the next run
becomes the head. Although we focus on the architecture,
we assume the router execution spans a 4-stage pipeline.
The packets have variable size and are composed of a
Head Flit (HF), zero or more Body Flits (BFs), and one Tail
Flit (TF). A Single Flit (SF) packet is also supported. The
flit formats are depicted in Figure 4. HFs and SFs (resp.
BFs and TFs) are identical except for the flit type, which
distinguishes their semantics. For transmission, a flit may
be further divided in Physical Units (phits) to match the
pipeline depth (i.e. 4 phits of 35 bits, not shown in Figure 4).
The shaded elements in the figures are not part of the
baseline NoC. They are extensions required to implement
the fault containment presented in this work. Ingress Filters
and Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) Generators are added
to the input ports of the routers cf. Figure 3. CRC codes and
Last Output Port (LOP) data are added to the flit header cf.
Figure 4. These additions will be detailed in Section 4.
3.2 The Error Model
We have derived a functional error model capturing all im-
pacts of soft errors on the baseline NoC and their durations.
The model is based on the analysis of [6], introduced in Sec-
tion 2, and assumes single error scenarios. From the analysis
of an implementation of the baseline NoC architecture, a
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4TABLE 1
Soft error effects per component
Component Fault Effects on flits
Corruption Loss Derouting Blocking
IB X X X
Crossbar X X X
SA X X X
VCAC X
Link X X X
fault occurring in the router or link that becomes a soft error
may cause the following effects: flit corruption, flit loss, flit
derouting, and flit blocking. Moreover, the effect depends
on the affected component, as described in Table 1.
Flit corruption regards cases where either the flit header
or the payload gets corrupted, but the flit reaches the router
or network interface downstream. Flit loss regards the
cases where the flit is lost before reaching the downstream
router/network interface. Flit derouting accounts for cases
where the flit is forwarded to the wrong router/network
interface, whether the flit is corrupt or not. Blocking regards
cases where the traffic is blocked at the router and cannot
progress anymore. Notice that delayed transmission is in-
cluded in this classification as a case of temporary blocking.
As mentioned previously, soft errors may cause static as
well as transient effects. For instance, flit corruption may
be a static effect when an error affects the pointer for a
circular queue at the input buffer causing it to continuously
read with the wrong offset; the blocking effect can be static
when caused by a faulty VCAC, or transient when caused
e.g. by losing the arbitration. This depends on the actual
implementation and will be discussed in details in the next
section. Static effects violate the resilience requirement since
the system will not return to an operational state.
Last but not least, flit corruption and derouting may
violate the predictability of the NoC, thereby violating
the real-time requirements. This is essentially due to error
propagation: a corrupt/derouted flit will affect other trans-
missions when arriving at the wrong router or VC queue
[6]. This violates predictability in two ways: by causing the
propagation of unexpected load through the NoC, and the
indirect corruption of packets from other traffic streams.
Notice that the error model does not include errors in
the configuration memory of FPGAs, assuming they are
handled by techniques such as scrubbing [26].
4 HARDENING THE NOC
We harden the presented baseline NoC against the identi-
fied vulnerabilities to soft errors. These vulnerabilities are
addressed by three mechanisms: Fault Containment (FC),
Resilient Router Design (RR), and Reliable Transport (RT).
These three mechanisms operate in different layers of the
NoC and allow to address the high assurance systems
requirements as shown in Table 2.
Let us first give an overview of the mechanisms. Fault
containment is responsible for ensuring the integrity of the
packets in the network. It is also responsible for containing
the error to the affected router, preventing its propagation
through the network and ensuring the predictability of the
NoC. The policy for fault containment is packet dropping.
TABLE 2
Requirements addressed in the different layers of the NoC
OSI Layer Requirements
Integrity Resilience Real-time
4-7. Transport - App. RT
3. Network FC FC
2. Data-link FC RR RR, FC
1. Physical RR RR
Whenever a corrupt or derouted packet is detected, it
is dropped. We distinguish between the integrity of the
packet’s routing data and the integrity of the payload. The
routing data’s integrity is checked on a hop-to-hop basis, the
payload’s integrity is checked on an end-to-end basis, since
the payload is only relevant upon its delivery.
The resilient router design is responsible for limiting
the effects of soft errors in time, ensuring that resilience
and predictability are satisfied. Whenever an error affects
a component in the router, its resilient design ensures that
the component will recover in a bounded period of time.
The reliable transport of data is then responsible for
guaranteeing the packet delivery and integrity, since packets
may be dropped due to errors. The reliable transport is
flexible. It can be implemented to operate transparently in
the transport layer or explicitly in the layers above. An
example of the latter is a hardware component such as
the Direct Memory Access (DMA) controller, which can
implement its own protocol. In the sequel, we detail each
mechanism.
4.1 Fault Containment
To contain the propagation of an error-affected flit, the
router is equipped with ingress filters in its input ports,
as shown in Figure 3. The filter is responsible for deciding
whether the flit is valid and may be safely propagated or
not. If not, the error-affected flit is dropped before altering
the router’s state. It executes in parallel with the existing
route management logic.
The ingress filter must contain flits affected by errors in
the upstream router. This boils down to detecting corruption
and derouting, similarly to [22]. At the routers, only the
routing data (flit header) is checked against corruption.
4.1.1 Containing corrupt flits
To detect corruption, the flits are equipped with Error-
Detecting Code (EDC). EDCs, such as parity bit and Ham-
ming code, differ on their detection capability. CRC is cho-
sen due to its error detection capabilities that cover not only
uncorrelated bit flips but also bursts of errors, a typical effect
of crosstalk (corruption at the links). We employ the 3-bit
CRC generator polynomial 0x5 = (x3 + x+ 1) and the 2-bit
0x2 = (x2 + 1), which are able to detect a single bit flip or a
burst of up to 3 and 2 erroneous bits, respectively [27]. This
is sufficient given that the CRC is expected to be checked
before a second error occurs. Applying other EDCs or other
CRC polynomials at design time is possible but not in the
scope of this paper. No configuration registers are required.
Figure 4 shows the CRC bits added to the flits, in the
first phit of BF/TFs and in the second phit of HF/SFs. We
protect only the flit header because it allows corruption to
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5be detected without requiring the whole flit to be received
and processed. Detection can be performed in parallel with
route management and can effectively prevent the flit from
taking part in the next arbitration cycle without additional
delay or stage in the pipeline.
Due to the route management at each router, the CRC
code of HF/SFs must be updated accordingly. The new
hash is calculated by CRC Gen (see Figure 3) after the route
has been updated and only must be ready when the flit is
leaving the buffer. When the flit transmission starts, the old
CRC hash is overwritten with the new one. BF/TF headers
are not modified, thus their CRCs are not updated.
In addition to the cases concerning corruption due to
transport, corruption during processing must also be ac-
counted for. Regarding the transmission of an already-
forwarded flit, the CRC stored in the buffer must be invali-
dated after being used, so that, in case the flit is forwarded
a second time, it may be detected and contained. Regarding
the route management, the CRC must be calculated based
on a trusted copy of the updated route.
4.1.2 Containing derouted flits
The detection is not trivial because it must differentiate
between a correctly routed flit and a flit forwarded in the
wrong direction, despite their correct header routing data.
To differentiate them, we check the LOP, the last output port
traversed by the flit. Although the principle is the same,
let us address HF/SFs first, and then BF/TFs, due to their
different formats.
In case of a HF/SF, the flit contains the route encoded as
a series of runs (output port and a hop counter). At the input
port, the ingress filter will check whether the current input
port is the one connected with the output port requested at
the last router, the LOP. For instance: the SF’s requests the
output port “North” (N) and in the next router is processed
at the input port “East” (E), which characterizes a derouting,
since it should be processed at an input port “South” (S). The
input port knows at design time to which output port it is
connected, e.g. S connected to N, E to W, and so on. The
LOP can be found in the first or in the last position in the
route, due to route rotation, and is determined at run-time.
In case of a BF/TF, the checking works in the same way
but a field containing the LOP is added to the flit header (see
Figure 4). The field is updated at each hop (similarly to the
above-mentioned CRC update): the LOP stored at the input
buffer overwrites the field in the flit when the flit is being
transmitted. The flit’s LOP field does not need to be covered
by the CRC because, in the event of an error corrupting the
LOP field, it will not be valid at the next input port and the
flit will be dropped. This way, the CRC of the BF/TF remains
unchanged along the route. Notice that the correct operation
of the mechanism requires the integrity of the LOP stored at
the input buffer, which can be achieved e.g. by storing the
value twice, one reserved for the flit header and the other
for the actual routing purpose.
Let us now address the two cases regarding the uplinks.
When the flit goes from the network interface into the
network, no checking is necessary, since no derouting is
possible so far. When the flit leaves the network and reaches
the network interface, the network interface checks whether
the last requested port is equal to its port number.
4.2 Resilient Router Design
To achieve a resilient router it is necessary to eliminate
scenarios where soft errors lead to static effects. Although
we discuss the architecture, the implementation plays an
important role to achieve resilience. Therefore, we assume
that the components are implemented in a way that they
continue responding in each arbitration cycle independently
from the success of the previous arbitration cycle. We now
address each component separately.
4.2.1 Pre-processing
The pre-processing contains the route management and the
newly added CRC generator and input filter, discussed in
the previous section. A transient fault in the pre-processing
may cause flit corruption and derouting. The effects are
transient since the state is reset at the arrival of each flit.
4.2.2 Input Buffer
The component is responsible for receiving and storing flits,
and in parallel, interacting with the arbitration logic and
forwarding flits. A transient fault in the input buffer may
cause transient flit corruption, loss, and derouting.
Soft errors cause static effects in this component when
implementing the buffer as one memory (Data Buffer in
Figure 3). This is the case, for instance, when optimizing
the design for Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs).
In such a design, the virtual channel queues are inside
the memory and each queue is managed through its read
and write pointers. The data required for routing decisions
(e.g. output port, flit type) are also kept in a queue at the
Control Buffer due to the limited access to the memory.
The static corruption then happens when the control and
data buffers have two pointers and an error causes them to
desynchronize or to continuously access the memory with a
wrong offset. To prevent this, the Control Buffer must store
the pointer and the Data Buffer derives its pointer from that
one when required. Similar care is required when handling
the flit as phits. In addition, flits received when a virtual
channel queue is full must be dropped while keeping the
current queue data and state unaltered.
4.2.3 Crossbar Switch
The crossbar switch connects a given input buffer to an out-
put port. The selection is configured by the switch arbiter.
A faulty crossbar causes flit corruption, loss, and derouting.
The effects are however transient, since the state is reset at
each arbitration.
4.2.4 Switch Arbiter
The arbiter has two stages [25]. The first stage arbitrates in
parallel, for each output port, one input buffer that requests
access. The second stage, at each input buffer, arbitrates a
flit from one of the virtual channels that received a grant
from the first stage. Each stage is implemented as a Round
Robin scheduler. For wormhole switching, the arbiter is also
aware of the virtual channel reservation states managed by
the VCAC.
An error affecting the arbiter may cause flit derouting,
flit loss, and priority loss. Flit derouting and loss occur when
an error corrupts the arbiter when a grant is being accepted
http://publikationsserver.tu-braunschweig.de/get/64988
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Fig. 5. The Resilient VC Flow Control: Mealy state machine.
or when it is configuring the crossbar. Those effects are guar-
anteed to be transient because the grant and configuration
data is new at each arbitration cycle. Priority loss occurs
when an error affects the state of a round robin arbiter.
A faulty Round Robin may cause priority loss. To ensure
that this priority loss is transient (i.e. transient blocking in-
stead of static), the arbiter must detect invalid priorities and
advance to a valid one. Encoding priorities (Most Recently
Served) as one-hot already serves the purpose. Then, when
no bits or more than one bit is “hot”, the priorities are reset
to a initial state, ensuring a resilient arbiter.
The same applies to priority-based arbiters, where VCs
have different priorities. In this case, an error affecting the
arbiter may also cause flit derouting, flit loss, and priority
loss. Those effects are transient since the grants and requests
per priority are new at each arbitration cycle. However,
depending on the tie-breaking policy implemented by the
arbiter, e.g. round-robin arbitrates requests of same priority
to the same output port, the considerations above must also
be taken into account.
4.2.5 Virtual Channel Access Controller
The VCAC manages the access to virtual channels at each
output port. Due to wormhole switching, an input buffer
has exclusive access to a VC at an output port, creating
a “hole” that starts with the first flit of the packet and
closes with the last one (the “worm”). A fault affecting
the VCAC then leads to an improper VC release or an
improper reservation. Both may provoke static blocking at
the router. An improper VC reservation leads to packet
blocking ranging from transient to static because it cannot be
detected without knowing the state of the upstream routers
or until the arrival of a new packet from a certain direction,
which is not guaranteed.
To prevent blocking effects, we propose a resilient virtual
channel flow control. Figure 5 presents the state machine,
which is an extension of [6]. The extension is depicted
with bold lines. Transitions are in the Mealy format: condi-
tion/output. Detecting an improper VC reservation requires
either a timeout or knowing the state of the upstream router.
Since timeouts for managing virtual channels are not really
an option2, we adopt additional wires between routers. The
scheme requires one wire per VC that implements worm-
hole switching to inform a router of the VC reservation state
of the upstream router.
1. Transitions 1, 2, 4 and 6 also release in all output ports reservations
of the respective VC to the input buffer in question.
2. For instance, finding a suitable timeout value, which depends on
the traffic. Values too large result in high latencies; values too small
result in packet loss/corruption.
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Fig. 6. Examples of resilient VC reservation handling, considering one
VC and two streams traversing the router as shown in a. b: regular
operation; c: improper release; d,e,f : improper reservation.
The regular VC reserve/release operation in Figure 5
comprises the transitions 1 to 4, as well as transition 7, which
refuses access to a VC reserved to another input buffer. An
example is given in Figure 6b: first, packets in input N and
W request access to the same VC in output E; N wins the
reservation first and its flits are being transmitted (trans. 2
and 3) while the packet in W waits (trans. 7); finally, the
transfer is completed, the VC is released (trans. 4), and
W may continue. In addition to the regular behavior, the
state machine specifies the behavior for faulty scenarios,
which are divided in two categories: improper release and
improper reservation.
The “improper release” represents cases where flits with-
out routing data are at the head of the VC queue at the input
buffer and no VC is reserved for it. These are handled by
transition 5, which signals the input buffer to drop the flit.
Examples are head-less packets and early VC release caused
by a transient fault. The former is shown in Figure 6c, where
the flits of the head-less packet in N are discarded.
The “improper reservation” represents cases where the
VC is not correctly released. Two situations may occur: the
queue at the input buffer for the improperly reserved VC is
either empty or not empty. Transitions 4 and 6 handle the
case where the queue is not empty: a HF/SF tries to reserve
a VC and it is already reserved for his own input buffer,
the reservation is handed over to the new packet and the
router resumes regular operation (trans. 3 or 4). Transition
8 handles the case where the queue is empty: the VC is
released if it is empty and the VC upstream is released. If the
VC is reserved upstream, no assumptions can be made since
the rest of the packet may be still coming. Figures 6d and 6e
show examples for transitions 8 and 6, respectively. In 6d,
a tail-less packet in N is forwarded and the queue is empty
afterwards; when the upstream reservation is released, the
respective VC is also released. In 6e, a tail-less packet in
N is followed by a second packet, which takes over the
reservation (trans. 6) and resumes regular operation. In
addition, transitions 1, 2, 4 and 6 must also release the VC in
all output ports where they are reserved for the same input
buffer. Figure 6f shows an example for such a case, where a
VC is improperly reserved in output port S. The reservation
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Fig. 7. Comparison of link input signals and the registered data using
start-of-flit and valid signals. a: regular operation; b,c: error cases.
is released by the packet in N (trans. 2) before resuming
regular operation.
With the proposed scheme, transient faults will result
only in transient effects since they will last only until one of
the transitions 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 or 8 occur.
4.2.6 Link
The link has control and data signals which can be af-
fected by faults. Faults affecting the data signals cause flit
corruption, which are detected at the ingress filter of the
next router. Faults in the control signals may cause one-
flit loss or blocking lasting one arbitration cycle, depending
on whether the valid signal or the flow-control is affected.
To prevent multi-flit loss due to synchronization issues
when transmitting flits as phits, a start-of-flit signal must
be employed instead of a simple valid signal. In the former,
the signal is enabled only when transmitting the first phit
of a flit, while in the latter the signal is enabled during the
transmission of all phits.
The concept is illustrated in Figure 7, where a flit f is
composed of 4 phits (f.1 to f.4) transmitted subsequently on
the Data bus. The first phit of a flit is highlighted with thick
lines. In regular operation, Figure 7a, start-of-flit and valid
signals have the same effect: the flit is received as intended
by the sender, the registered data. In case of an error causing
the start-of-flit to be set (or propagated) high one cycle later,
only the affected flit will be lost when transmitting flits
back-to-back. This is seen in 7b where the first received flit
starts with the second phit but the subsequent flit is received
correctly. However, in the case of the valid signal, it is not
possible to identify the end of a flit and start of the next
one. This is seen in 7c, where first received flit starts with
the second phit and includes the first phit of the second flit,
since the receiver expects four phits after the valid signal
is first set high. The same occurs to the subsequent flits,
resulting in the loss of all flits transmitted back-to-back
on that link after the error. Corrupt flits are discarded (cf.
Section 4.1 and Section 4.4).
Faults affecting the VC reservation signals introduced
above may cause the loss of a packet when it enables the
transition 8 in Figure 5.
4.3 Between Lower and Upper Layers
Before presenting the reliable transport, let us discuss what
has been achieved with the hardening so far. As summa-
rized in Table 2, the proposed fault containment ensures:
integrity of the data utilized in the lower layers of the NoC,
i.e. the routing data; and part of the real-time requirement
as it prevents the error from propagating to other traffic
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Fig. 8. Maximum latency of an 8kB DMA on different ARQ protocols [7].
streams and to other routers (the “background traffic” in
[6]). The resilient router design ensures the resilience and the
remaining part of the real-time requirement by ruling out
static effects and providing for a recovery limited in time.
Let us summarize the behavior of the network before ap-
plying the reliable transport. On the end-to-end perspective
at the network interfaces, verifiable with [6], a packet sent
through the NoC and affected by an error is either:
1) delivered correctly,
2) delivered correctly with a small delay lrec,
3) delivered with corrupt payload,
4) or dropped/lost.
The reliable transport is responsible for guaranteeing
the packet delivery and guaranteeing the integrity of the
transported data, i.e. the payload.
4.4 Reliable Transport
Aiming at flexibility, our approach provides guaranteed de-
livery and payload integrity on an end-to-end basis. There-
fore, the reliable transport is implemented in the transport
layer or above. It relies on EDCs or ECCs for error detection
and possibly correction and relies on protocols, such as ARQ
and multipath routing, for guaranteeing packet delivery.
The approach enables the system controller or application
to configure at runtime in the network interface the appro-
priate configuration (protocol+EDC/ECC) for each transac-
tion according to its characteristics, reducing unnecessary
overheads, both in terms of traffic and power consumption.
For instance, a DMA transfer may use its own optimized
protocol, while a command to an actuator could use Stop-
and-Wait ARQ. When a retransmission cannot be afforded
due to a deadline miss, multipath routing can be employed.
Besides, periodic sensor readings may require only integrity
guarantee with EDC/ECC and no delivery guarantee. More-
over, the diverse traffic may co-exist in the NoC.
Formal guarantees for ARQ-based protocols operating
in the transport layer of wormhole-switched NoCs have
been introduced in [7], an extension of [13]. The work
provides formal analysis for three protocols: Stop-and-Wait,
Go-Back-N, and DMA ARQ, an optimized protocol for
DMA transfers. Formal guarantees for other protocols, such
as multipath routing, can be similarly derived. In [7], the
authors show that the overhead introduced by the pro-
tocols’ handshaking is acceptable and they perform very
well with typical real-time on-chip traffic, provided that
the appropriate configuration is employed. As an example,
the latency of an 8kB DMA transfer when using different
protocols and configurations is plotted in Figure 8 (extracted
from [7], where the setup is described). In the figure, in the
error free case (0-error), the handshaking overhead of ARQ
is almost negligible for Go-Back-N with N=4 (GBN4) and
the DMA ARQ (DMA).
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8To provide minimum performance guarantees, formal
analyses assume a given number of errors that the system
may experience in a given time interval, the so called k-
error scenario [7], [13]. In the NoC, it translates to errors
affecting a given packet or transmission. k depends on the
Bit Error Rate (BER), to which the NoC is subject, and can be
calculated using methods in [28]. k must be selected so that
the probability that the packet or transmission experiences
more than k errors is negligible according to compliance
levels of safety standards [2], [3]. The k-error scenario is
then used to calculate the worst-case latencies and response
times of the system under errors. Usually, at most one error
will be considered since the probability of two errors within
a hundred clock cycles is negligible. Naturally, the final
latencies of the NoC depends on the specific protocol. In
Figure 8, latencies in scenarios with 0, 1 and 2 errors are
shown. Error occurrences imply slightly longer latencies due
to retransmissions and the timeout period. Nonetheless, that
does not prevent their use in a real-time system. Alterna-
tively, the error case can be modeled as an overload scenario
in typical worst-case response time analysis [29].
Note about the delay lrec: when employing retransmis-
sion protocols, it is not necessary to know the exact value of
lrec. The formal guarantee under errors only requires lrec to
be smaller than the time to retransmit the packet [7].
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate the resulting NoC’s reliability, performance
under errors and implementation overhead when compared
to the baseline NoC. The performance under errors is eval-
uated with synthetic random traffic as well as a real-world
use case. We employ a NoC in a 2D-mesh topology with
different sizes, 5 VCs, and one up-link per router. From the
reliable transport layer, we employ only EDCs to ensure the
payload integrity.
The objective of the experiments is to evaluate the pre-
dictability and reliability of the NoC under soft errors. Eval-
uating the impact of bit-flips in the NoC or the performance
of ARQ-based protocols is not our goal. Transport protocols
have well know properties and can be applied on top of
the resulting NoC. On that topic, the interested reader can
refer to [7], [13]. On the impact of soft errors in NoCs, the
interested reader can refer to the reports of [6], [11], [23].
5.1 Reliability
Let us evaluate the reliability metricR(t), which is the prob-
ability that the NoC does not fail during a time interval [0, t]
[28]. In a high dependability real-time system, the failure is
defined as the violation of integrity, resilience or real-time
latency guarantees (which include static effects leading to
blocking) due to errors. Packet loss is not considered as a
failure, since it is handled in the transport layer. In practice,
expected BERs3 are in the order of 10−9 bit-flips per hour
[31]. Moreover, the design must however consider higher
rates (up to 10−6/hour) as a safety margin [33]. Here, we
consider BERs from 10−9 up to 10−6/hour. Additionally,
we consider a permanent fault rate of 10−8/h per router4
3. We derive [30] the BERs for seq. and comb. logic from [31] for 65nm
CMOS SRAM. Masking effects [32] are not taken into account.
4. The occurrence of a permanent fault leads directly to failure. The
fault rate per router is derived from processor failure rates in [34].
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Fig. 9. Reliability comparison of the proposed NoC and non-resilient
ones. A 5x5 NoC size is considered.
Figure 9 plots the analytical R(t) for the non-resilient
baseline and the proposed NoCs (resilient), considering a
5x5 2D-mesh topology. Two variants of the baseline NoC
with CRC checking (Base+CRC) and with Triple Modular
Redundancy (Base+TMR) are also plotted. The TMR is non-
reparable with an ideal voter [28]. We can observe that,
independent from the BER, regular non-resilient NoCs are
limited in time due to errors from which they cannot re-
cover. Employing ingress filters (Base+CRC) improves the
reliability but it continues limited. Moreover, contrary to
common sense, triplicating the NoC does not make it more
reliable with respect to soft errors. In time, the more-than-
double area overhead of the TMR has more impact than the
initial advantage of withstanding one error. When consid-
ering TMR with periodic reboot, e.g. weekly, the reliability
would reach 0.962 (5x5) and 0.907 (8x8) before the reboot
(BER 10−9). The proposed hardening enables the NoC to
drastically increase the reliability in time by appropriately
containing soft errors and recovering from them.
Let us evaluate the Failure In Time (FIT). The metric
measures the number of failures in a billion hours. Table 3
reports the FIT rates for different NoC sizes and BERs.
Even in small topologies, non-resilient NoCs present very
high failure rates. Besides, TMR leads to more failures
than no redundancy. To put the values in perspective, high
dependability systems, e.g. in the automotive domain, must
present less than 10 random hardware failures in time when
implementing critical functionality with SIL 4, the highest
safety integrity level [4]. In a system providing a less critical
functionality with SIL 1, the lowest integrity level, up to 104
failures in time are acceptable [4]. Notice that a final FIT rate
for the MPSoC must consider other components, resulting
in even larger FITs. As a component of the final system, the
MPSoC requires a dependable and resilient NoC.
Despite the NoC’s high reliability, errors still have an
impact on the traffic latency while the routers recover from
them. This impact is evaluated next.
TABLE 3
Comparison of FIT rates
BER/h 3x3 NoC 5x5 NoC 8x8 NoC
Baseline 10
−9 3.38 · 104 9.40 · 104 2.41 · 105
10−6 3.38 · 107 9.38 · 107 2.4 · 108
Base+CRC 10
−9 1.72 · 104 4.78 · 104 1.22 · 105
10−6 1.71 · 107 4.75 · 107 1.22 · 108
Base+TMR 10
−9 4.06 · 104 1.13 · 105 2.89 · 105
10−6 4.05 · 107 1.13 · 108 2.88 · 108
Resilient 10
−9 9.0 · 101 2.5 · 102 6.4 · 102
10−6 9.0 · 101 2.5 · 102 6.4 · 102
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Fig. 10. Observed worst-case NoC performance under random uniform traffic as the load increases, varying NoC sizes, packet sizes and error rates.
5.2 Performance under errors: random traffic
Let us now evaluate how the proposed NoC behaves under
errors. The performance is evaluated through error injection
experiments carried out in the OMNeT++ simulator [35]. For
that, uniform random traffic consisting of 3-flit packets was
injected in the NoC, with the injection rate varying with the
experiment. The evaluation considers a clock period of 2ns
and a transmission time of 1 clock cycle per flit. The errors
from Table 1 were injected randomly into the NoC5. The
occurrence probability of an error depends on the affected
data structure and the BER. The BERs employed range from
10−9 to 10−5/h.
In the first experiment, faults are injected randomly into
the whole NoC. Figure 10 shows the observed worst-case
performance of the proposed NoC, as the load increases, for
different NoC sizes, packets sizes and BERs. Performance
degradation is minimal even when experiencing high error
rates. By design, errors also cause packets to be dropped
when corrupted or derouted. On average, 1.11 · 10−14% of
the packets were dropped under BER 10−5, 1.11 · 10−16%
under 10−7, and 1.11 · 10−18% under 10−9.
The impact of errors on latency in the hardened NoC
depends on the number of errors that affect a packet in
the network and on the current load of the router where
the error occurs. The load depends on the mapping, the
routing algorithm and indirectly on the NoC size – a larger
NoC may present higher loads in central routers, up to the
maximum load a router is able to handle. This can be seen in
Figure 10a, where maximum latencies6 both in the error free
and in the error cases increase with the load until congestion
occurs in the network, e.g. 0.33 in 5x5 NoC. Moreover, the re-
sults show that the performance degradation is predictable
even under very high load and BER. Increasing the packet
size does not have major impact on the latency under errors.
This is confirmed by Figure 10b, which shows the NoC
performance when doubling the packet size (6-flit packets).
In a second experiment, we evaluate the error prop-
agation between affected and unaffected VCs. Therefore,
errors are injected only in the central router and its links.
We then differentiate affected traffic stream, whose packets
traverse the faulty router, and unaffected streams, on a VC
whose traffic do not traverse that router. It is observed that
error effects do not propagate between different VCs as the
latency, integrity and delivery of packets in unaffected VCs
are not affected. Considering that different traffic classes
and criticalities are allocated to different VCs, this means
5. To speed-up simulation, errors were injected in active areas with-
out impairing the evaluation.
6. Latency does not comprise retransmission (not under evaluation)
or the time spent in the network interface (in case of congestion), only
the time spent inside the network.
that sufficient independence is achieved in the presence
of errors. The same behavior is observed across different
network sizes.
In a third experiment, we evaluate the performance in
time of the proposed NoC and compare it with a baseline
one as errors are injected randomly in the whole NoC. The
results are reported in Figure 11, where each point plotted
represents a time interval of two thousand hours. Figure 11a
shows the number of failed streams in time, from a total
of 25 traffic streams in the NoC. The same definition of
failure from Section 5.1 is used. The resilient NoC is able to
recover from errors, as it ensures that soft errors have only
transient effects. In contrast, the baseline NoC is not able to
do so and traffic streams are blocked when certain errors
occur. Notice that not all errors lead to a stream failure (cf.
Section 3.2). Packet delivery is reported in Figure 11b. The
metric consists of the overall number of packet delivered
among all traffic streams in the NoC relative to the error
free case (100%). With time, the baseline NoC delivers less
packets as a result of blocking and static effects. In the
resilient NoC, on the other hand, packets are delivered
continuously albeit with expected loss (1.39 · 10−15%). The
maximum latency in time observed in the resilient and base-
line NoCs are plotted in Figures 11c and 11d, respectively.
The latencies are given for each traffic stream, 25 in total
(some lines overlap). The predictability of the proposed NoC
is seen as the maximum latency varies seldom and within
a limited range. In contrast, the unpredictable behavior of a
non-resilient NoC presents very high latencies or blocking
(latencies equal 0). Moreover, Figures 11c and 11d shows
the observed experimental trend that was previously only
illustrated in Figure 2.
Let us now compare the performance of the resilient
NoC with TMR. Differently than in our approach, the la-
tency and packet delivery do not vary with or without errors
in a NoC with TMR configuration. However, that holds as
long as the TMR itself does not fail, i.e. 2-out-of-3 instances
survive. After failure, depending on the voter, the same
behavior of the baseline NoC is observed.
In addition to the presented experiments, the proposed
NoC has been evaluated in many other experiments (thou-
sands), where we vary the packet sizes, traffic patterns,
network sizes, and error rates. The experiments employed
benchmarks as well as randomly generated mappings and
loads, the latter as an effort to stimulate worst-case scenar-
ios. In this paper, only some results are reported (>120).
Compared to these, similar or better performance (i.e. no
worse case) was observed across all experiments (for differ-
ent number of flits and traffic patterns).
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Fig. 11. Performance in time of the proposed NoC (resilient) and a non-resilient one (baseline). 5x5 NoCs, 3-flit packets, traffic injection rate 0.2
(flit/cycle/node) and BER=10−6.
Fig. 12. Overview of the FMS application [36].
Fig. 13. FMS: Localization task group [36].
5.3 Performance under errors: FMS use case
Let us now evaluate the NoC with the FMS as a realistic use
case. The Flight Management System is a high dependability
embedded application in modern avionics that automates
several in-flight tasks. It is widely found in civilian as well
as in military aircraft. A functional overview of Thales’ FMS
[36] is shown in Figure 12 (arrows indicate the data flow).
The application consists of 6 task groups: Sensors, Localiza-
tion, Flightplan, Nearest, Trajectory and Guidance. The tasks
in the groups are executed periodically, when in automatic
mode. Some of them can also be triggered aperiodically
through a manual intervention by the pilot. In our evalu-
ation, we focus on the Localization task group.
The Localization task group is responsible for periodically
computing the Best Computed Position (BCP), the most
probable position of the aircraft, using data from sensors,
such as Global Positioning System and Pure Inertia Ref-
erence System, received from the Sensors task group. The
task group is detailed in Figure 13 (arrows indicate the data
flow). The BCP computation also must account for settings
that can be modified by the pilot, captured in Figure 13 by
the aperiodic tasks LOCA1, LOCA2 and LOCA3. The ex-
ecution follows the Acquisition-Execution-Restitution task
model, where at the end of each execution, the output of
a task is written to the dependent tasks’ buffers [36]. The
FMS has, among others, a requirement at the application
level stating that a task can execute at most 3 times without
receiving new valid input data. In that case, the last valid
input data is used. After that, the task enters an error mode,
i.e. fails. Corrupt data is discarded and not considered as
valid.
When mapped to an MPSoC, the tasks’ outputs are
transferred with traffic streams over the NoC. Table 4 list
the traffic streams associated with the periodic tasks of the
Localization task group. For instance, the output of LOCC1
is transferred to LOCC2’s buffer through stream C1 → C2
every 200ms on a 11-flit-long packet. Since the application
tolerates data loss, the traffic streams only employ EDCs to
guarantee integrity in the reliable transport, i.e. do not em-
ploy a reliable transport protocol to guarantee delivery. For
other cases, such as application initialization, e.g. through
DMA, which might require guaranteed data delivery, the
interested reader can refer to [7].
Let us now assess the failure probability of the Lo-
calization task group due to soft errors in the NoC. The
evaluation uses a BER of 10−6/h and different NoC sizes,
safely assuming that each stream traverses the longest route
in the NoC. The wost-case packet latencies are obtained
from the interference they experience in the NoC and the
application activation patterns [24]. The failure probability
in the resilient NoC equals to the probability that three
subsequent packets are lost or corrupt while inside the NoC.
Due to the NoC’s properties, such as fault containment, and
TABLE 4
Localization computing tasks performance under BER 10−6/h
Traffic
Stream
Period
[s]
Size
(flits)
Failure probability
3x3 NoC 5x5 NoC 8x8 NoC
C1→ C2 0.2 11 1.31 · 10−39 2.57 · 10−39 5.64 · 10−39
C2→ C3 1.6 11 1.31 · 10−39 2.57 · 10−39 5.64 · 10−39
C2→ C4 1.6 11 1.31 · 10−39 2.57 · 10−39 5.64 · 10−39
C3→ C1 5 3 3.37 · 10−42 1.13 · 10−41 3.81 · 10−41
Task group overall: 3.94 · 10−39 7.71 · 10−39 1.69 · 10−38
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Fig. 14. Synthesis results for a 5-port router of the baseline NoC (B) and
the resilient NoC (R).
as shown in previous experiments, it suffices to consider
errors directly affecting the packets under evaluation, which
include the packet contents and registers critical to packet
transmissions in the network. The results per stream and
per task group are shown in Table 4. The very low failure
probabilities per stream and also for the whole task group
show that this type of traffic can be safely transported in the
network without the use of transport protocols even under
high BERs. It results in less traffic in the network, since there
is no overhead from transport protocols, and consequently
in lower power consumption. This type of traffic is also
typically seen in transmissions of periodic sensor readings.
5.4 Implementation overhead
Let us now evaluate the implementation cost to achieve
the results above. The NoC was implemented in VHDL
and synthesized in Xilinx ISE targeting a Virtex-6 FPGA
(xc6vlx760) and a frequency of 100MHz. We report the data
for a 5-port router of the proposed and the baseline NoCs.
The router size increases 5.39% when accounting for all the
data in the router (optimized for FPGAs, each data buffer in-
stantiates a Block RAM). Figure 14 details the resource usage
and total power for the router and its internal components.
In the figure, the input buffer is divided into two categories:
the control buffer and ingress filter (CB+CRC+LOP) and
the remaining components of the input buffer (IB). The 5
BRAMs are not included in the figure.
The implementation overhead of the proposed NoC
when compared to the baseline is caused mainly by the
ingress filter and by the resilient VC flow control. Indeed,
the ingress filter (CB+CRC+LOP) is responsible for most
of the additional register bits (43.73%) and 36.06% logic
(LUTs). However, such filter is a standard component in
many resilient approaches, such as [20], [22], and can be
considered as a necessary baseline resiliency cost. The over-
head specific to our approach is introduced by the resilient
VC flow control (VCAC), which requires additional wires
in the links and control logic, corresponding for 10.40%
additional registers and 34.92% logic. Other minor over-
heads are caused e.g. by the packet-dropping logic in the
IB. In addition, we evaluated the energy consumption with
Xilinx Power Analyzer [37]. Under full load (random traffic
with random payload), the resilient router consumes 37.68%
more energy than baseline (cf. Figure 14). When idle (no
traffic), the overhead is 0.28% (not shown). Under regular
operation, the router load is expected to be closer to the
latter than to the former.
7. Not including the data buffers, synthesized as Block RAMs.
LUTs Regs LUTs Regs7 LUTs Regs7
0
2.5K
5K
7.5K
10K
12.5K
70.35%
93.78%>200%
>200%
22.04%
47.67%
[19] Base+TMR Our work
Baseline
Resilience
Overhead
Fig. 15. Comparison of resilience overhead per router (Virtex-6 FPGA).
Finally, in Figure 15, we compare the overhead of our
approach with TMR and related work [22] (although the
two approaches are not equivalent – cf. Section 2). Let
us first make two considerations about Figure 15. First,
our baseline router is very lean, implemented with the
minimal functionality required. Second, the synthesis tool
optimally maps the data buffers (28K bits) to Block RAMs
of the FPGA, leading to an apparent large overhead w.r.t.
register usage. Thus, our router stores over 17 times more
data than [22]’s. Nonetheless, our absolute overhead when
synthesized to the same Virtex-6 FPGA family is similar
to [22]’s. Considering all data in the router including data
buffers, our relative overhead is only 5.39% as opposed
to [22]’s 22.04%. In comparison to TMR, not only is our
approach much more efficient w.r.t. resource usage (area)
and power but also more effective (cf. Section 5.1). We are
able to achieve predictability and much higher reliability
with only a fraction (5.39%) of TMR’s total relative overhead
of >200%. Moreover, we require at most 37.68% (in a traffic
peak) additional power while TMR has a constant twofold
power overhead. Besides, TMR implies a substantial in-
crease in interconnecting wires, leading to design routing
complications, potential congestion and lower frequencies.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a resilient wormhole-
switched NoC hardened against soft errors. As opposed to
the state of the art, the NoC aims at the integrity, resilience
and real-time requirements of high dependability systems.
At the same time, it aims at preventing the occurrence of
silent data corruption, a challenge in such systems. Therefor,
the approach takes into account all possible durations and
impacts of soft errors. The errors are detected and handled
by three mechanisms distributed in several layers of the
network stack. For the sake of predictability and integrity,
error-affected packets are dropped and guaranteed packet
delivery is selectively provided on an end-to-end basis, with
formal timing guarantees. Our experimental evaluation in-
cludes an industrial avionics use case and shows that, even
under very high error rates, the NoC presents a predictable
behavior with an acceptable hardware overhead.
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